VI. The christian appearance of critique

270 "A chief merit" of mine, says Marheineke p. 75, 76, is "to have pointed out the weaknesses and exposed parts of the more recent exegetes and critics and to have shown how much they thereby stand in contradiction with Christianity."

[Notes for 270 here]

271 "If now, concludes Marheineke, such assertions (as those critics have brought forward) can still subsist with the predicate of Christianity, then one will also not deny it to Bauer, if one regards him in this context and under these circumstances which also mitigate his aberration."

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272 If only I had not myself declined this advantage, as soon as I have proved that the propositions and assertions of the more recent theologians stand in contradiction with Christianity! What, I should tolerate or demand that a predicate be attributed to me and my works, as soon as they are worth no more and no less than the previous theological works, a predicate which I have shown is unjustly attributed to these works? Errors, which are no less errors than those theological propositions, are, because these unjustly count as Christian, also to be labelled with the predicate of Christianity? I have, however, not even presented the matter in such a way that the theological assertions stand in contradiction with Christianity — I have rather sought to vindicate for them the glory that they are the completion of the theological element which is contained in Christianity and in holy scripture — I have only shown that they stand in contradiction with themselves, when they think they are in harmony with scripture. I have shown that if they want to be the correct explanation of holy scripture, this good opinion is false and erroneous, and that rather critique correctly grasps and explains scripture.

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273 Critique and the theological works therefore have nothing in common which could procure for both the same predicate, if it procures the predicate of the Christian for the one.

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274 Least of all is it common to them to be error.

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275 Common to them is only the intention to explain and recognise Christianity and holy scripture. But the intention does not do it, of course, but the manner and way in which one carries it out, yes already the way in which one conceives the resolve — whether it is earnest or not.

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276 Theology does not have the earnest resolve, since it leaves unexamined the presupposition of Christianity of its truth, of the divine origin of its founder or at least of its foundation by Jesus Christ — by sharing this presupposition with Christianity, it is Christian. But it also wants to be knowledge, it therefore investigates the statements of holy scripture and sets that presupposition aside for a moment, but only apparently: as soon as knowledge and research threaten the presupposition, this rises again and threatens and limits research: — in short, theology is this struggle in which research and the Christian presupposition mutually make each other into a mere appearance, into illusion.

[Notes for 276 here]

277 B. B. the matter of knowledge.

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278 The Christian appearance of critique. Again, however: that is quite Christian, very Christian, that the Christian presupposition itself dares to take up the fight with modern research and then even as mere appearance still proves itself powerful and strong. The appearance — and that presupposition is in itself only appearance — has thereby emerged as such.

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279 Critique, on the other hand, as scientific knowledge, has in itself not the slightest interest which could make the effort to be Christian significant for it; it does not even have an interest in posing to itself the question whether it is Christian or unchristian — its sole care is to be true, its sole question whether it is true.

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280 Only then, when the Christian presupposition asserts itself practically against it and wants to impose upon it the necessity of agreeing with it, when it therefore must express its result in the form that this presupposition is an illusion, then it can pronounce the proposition, in itself highly indifferent, that it is not Christian. For knowledge, at least, which is concerned only with truth, the pronouncement that it is not Christian can only be an indifferent proposition and have no other value than the proposition that it is not Jewish, not Muhammedan, not Chinese.

[Notes for 280 here]

281 If, however, the Christian consciousness and the Christian presupposition — as they indeed must — insist on their right and want to subjugate mankind, if it is therefore a question of the happiness of mankind, of the victory of freedom over servitude, of truth over deception, then it is the duty of critique to declare that it is anti-Christian and that it sees its world-historical glory as well as its task in being anti-Christian.

[Notes for 281 here]

282 "If according to him, says Marheineke p. 72, 73, the three first Gospels have proceeded from the religious views of the community, whose instruments the authors are, who produced them in artistic freedom from the self-consciousness of the community, then with this nothing is as yet determined either about the time when they arose, nor about the actual authors, and the hypothesis thus contains no contradiction against the previous traditional assumptions."

[Notes for 282 here]

283 One sees how dangerous it is to be praised as a Christian or as Christian, since already the praise that one stands in no contradiction with the "previous traditional assumptions", i.e., with the Christian presuppositions, would have to be life-threatening for the works to which it is given, if it were well-founded.

[Notes for 283 here]

284 No greater censure than that a critical work stands in no contradiction with the religious presuppositions — no greater praise than the recognition that it overturns these presuppositions!

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285 One Gospel — the fourth — gives itself out for one that was composed by an eyewitness, another — the first — is at least according to the tradition of the church composed by an eyewitness, the second is according to the same tradition written by a man who was the companion of an eyewitness and had heard his lectures on the life of Jesus, the third is according to the statement of its author composed exactly according to the statements of the eyewitnesses — and with all these statements of the Gospels themselves and with the ecclesiastical and religious presupposition, a critique which proves the literary origin of the Gospels would stand in no contradiction? And the time? The time when the Gospels were written is not to be designated by a critique which conceives them as products of the community, and indeed as products of the community which already laid down this rich treasure of experiences in them, as a very late one? It is already enough when critique proves that the Gospels were written in a time when one knew of nothing less than of the life of Jesus.

[Notes for 285 here]

286 "However one may think of the value of such a hypothesis, says Marheineke about the more recent critique, it is nevertheless clear that the right to present such a one conflicts with no article of teaching of the Protestant church and the faith of the Protestant church is thereby not assailed." It is rather overthrown, if it is proved that this faith was not effected by God and that the content of this faith, the redemption through Christ, was no heavenly gift, no divine message but a product of the community itself.

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287 If, however, it is the presupposition of the fourth Gospel that it was composed by an eyewitness, if the three others give themselves the appearance that they narrate history, and if they are to be traced back to eyewitnesses in the manner that ecclesiastical tradition assumes, is the critic who dissolves all that appearance, these assumptions and presuppositions, not guilty?

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288 Yes, he is guilty that he has sought out and confessed the truth; he is guilty that he has dissolved the appearance in order to give honour to the truth.

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289 And if I had sworn on the Gospels and the symbolic books, which is not even the case, I would still not be to put under accusation because of the results to which critique has led me. Yes, I wish I had sworn on the Gospels! As a critic I would still have incurred no guilt and not violated the oath.

[Notes for 289 here]

290 Would I be perjured if I have to explain the Gospels and, after critique has got to the bottom of it, express what is the matter with that appearance and with those presuppositions? Am I perjured if I let the Gospels themselves explain this? Perjured, if the Gospels promise to give absolute truth and if critique shows how far this promise reaches and is fulfilled? The critic who really lets the Gospels speak and express their whole secret, who does not, as the theologians do, stop their mouths, would be perjured?

[Notes for 290 here]

291 Marheineke wants to give my writings the appearance of Christianity and finally convinces himself that they are a glorification of Christianity. Herr Gruppe coincides with him in that he finds in my writing the appearance of Christianity, but diverges from him in that he exposes this appearance as mere appearance.

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292 Marheineke erred if he wanted to force the predicate of Christianity on my work with violence; Herr Gruppe is therefore also wrong in that he finds in it the appearance of Christianity. Marheineke refutes himself if he designates the hypotheses, to which he does not want to deny the predicate of the Christian, as such that are snatched purely from the air and have sprung from arbitrariness — he would have to presuppose that the character of the arbitrary and the airy essence is proper to the Christian — but he refutes himself more definitely if his conclusion on the Christian character of my work is mediated in the manner that I have carried the unchristian essence, which I have demonstrated in previous theology, fully to its consequence. Herr Gruppe refutes himself just as excellently by declaring outright that he understands nothing of my work, thus also confessing that everything he says of it fits everything else only not it.

[Notes for 292 here]

293 Herr Gruppe thinks, p. 38, "wherein the new consists that Bauer brings, that is not so easy to say" — reason enough for him not to say it and to spare himself the trouble of investigation, or (p. 61) "to exempt himself from a closer entering into the critical detail."

[Notes for 293 here]

294 "Wherein the more consequent carrying through of the Hegelian system consists, that is up to now difficult to ascertain from the book," says Herr Gruppe p. 50 — again reason enough for him not to examine the method, the manner of development and the general result to which it leads, not even to seek it out — reason enough for him to hold to individual "utterances" and to misunderstand them completely, but also reason enough for him on the following page p. 51 to say the opposite, namely to say that one finds in me still an exaggeration of the Hegelian doctrine of knowability. "That I want to destroy theology entirely, dissolve everything into the vertigo of philosophy, into its nothing" — reason enough immediately afterwards to say: "precisely because of this ambiguity (the ambiguity lies in that philosophy wants to dissolve everything into its vertigo and into its nothing!) it is equally difficult to catch Hegel or Bauer in particular on a teaching which would be directly unchristian."

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295 "Wherein the more consequent carrying through of the Hegelian system consists, that is up to now difficult to ascertain from the book," says Herr Gruppe p. 50 — again reason enough for him not to examine the method, the manner of development and the general result to which it leads, not even to seek it out — reason enough for him to hold to individual "utterances" and to misunderstand them completely, but also reason enough for him on the following page p. 51 to say the opposite, namely to say that one finds in me still an exaggeration of the Hegelian doctrine of knowability. "That I want to destroy theology entirely, dissolve everything into the vertigo of philosophy, into its nothing" — reason enough immediately afterwards to say: "precisely because of this ambiguity (the ambiguity lies in that philosophy wants to dissolve everything into its vertigo and into its nothing!) it is equally difficult to catch Hegel or Bauer in particular on a teaching which would be directly unchristian."

[Notes for 295 here]

296 So thinks, so writes a man who wants to save Christianity and defend the government. A man who just said that philosophy wants to dissolve everything into its nothing is capable of asserting that there are found in my writing passages in which a striving shows itself to keep philosophy on good terms with Christianity.

[Notes for 296 here]

297 Herr Gruppe could have spared himself this contradiction if he had either — which would have been most advisable — kept silent, or, if he absolutely wanted to enlighten public opinion, had proved the respect one must have for the public, namely studied the matter about which he wanted to speak.

[Notes for 297 here]

298 He could also have spared himself the trouble of dissolving the Christian appearance of individual utterances — no! of the single, the single passage about which he speaks, if he had looked more closely at the "utterances," yes, the single passage about which he speaks!

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299 In the treatise on the New Testament miracle I say (Synopt. II, 157), as religious, the self-consciousness of the spirit could at the rise of Christianity grasp itself in its universality and infinity only by annihilating itself as real self-consciousness and confronting its inner content as a single person outside itself. About this "utterance" Herr Gruppe says, "philosophy exercises at this place a great tolerance, it seems to want to recognise the personality and historical existence of Christ." p. 52. It is a pity that Herr Gruppe has not shown us by several more examples what he understands by tolerance and recognition. One explains the representation of Christ, says how it arose, declares it a deed of the religious spirit, and that seems to Herr Gruppe a recognition of the personality and historical existence of Christ!

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300 Herr Gruppe wanted to give the readers a very high idea of the bravery and speed with which he understands how to destroy the most dangerous appearance.

[Notes for 300 here]

301 But could he only count on readers who would not notice that there is no appearance at all which had to wait for a Herr Gruppe to find its dissolution?

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302 "Whatever Bauer may still say in particular — 'still'! 'in particular', on which Herr Gruppe does not enter! — such principles — (namely those which are similar to the principle on which it comes out with that 'utterance', when it is unmasked —) — are in a contradiction with Christianity which cannot be greater, and whoever knows how to distinguish bare palliations from leading principles will after such things by no words in the world any more — how pompous! by no words in the world any more! — let himself be deceived" (p. 53, 54).

[Notes for 302 here]

303 As if I made ever so many words to deceive the world and to talk it into believing that critique contained Christian baptism and knelt before the cross! I should want to deceive the world if on every page of my work I dissolve holy scripture? I used "bare palliations", instead of boasting of the open consequence and being proud of the power of the leading principles? I wanted to cover up in a theological manner, while I strive to bring the old and the new, unfreedom and freedom into their correct opposition and to let both decide their struggle?

[Notes for 303 here]

304 No! No! Herr Gruppe speaks in the rut of a presupposition which was fixed for him before he had heard of my writings, and which he holds fast when he set out against me, holds it so fast that he does not at all pay attention to where the opponent stands whom he has chosen to his misfortune. He could not imagine how far the courage of critique and freedom, how far its right could go; he thinks that no one can mean a matter so sincerely that he sacrifices everything to it and seeks to see through it, only it. He thinks one cannot sincerely serve a matter. He himself does not mean it even so far sincerely with his assertion that I sought to deceive through words and to bring forward bare palliations, that he sought to prove it by several examples; he leaves the poor assertion standing quite alone, and so little does the great man, who wants to defend the right of the government, understand to recognise in my writing the leading, openly lying principles, that he sees himself forced to hold to my essay "theological shamelessnesses" in order to get behind how I mean it with Christianity" p. 54.

[Notes for 304 here]

305 A miracle therefore, not the regular course of things, a chance, not what should have counted for him as the first necessity, this essay, not the thorough investigation of my writing brings him to the "assumption", "that also in my book the polemic is directed in truth not against theology, but against Christianity itself, with which the boundless procedure and the uniform loosening up of the Gospel in all parts is in the best harmony."

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306 Now, if I proceed boundlessly, i.e., set myself no limits before I have found them by means of research, let no one in the world, least of all Herr Gruppe, but only through the matter of my research see its limits, if I thus loosen up the Gospel in all parts, must Herr Gruppe then first reach for that essay in order to be allowed to "assume" that in my book the polemic is directed against Christianity? Is an assumption then still needed at all? Have I not in my book, for him who can read, "prevented all deception"?

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307 That the aversion to truth runs into contradictions is natural; this course can sometimes be an entertaining, yes a comical spectacle; but if the contradictions are too groundless, if they have no contact at all with the matter and are only the punishment for the inner weakness and the indolence which tries in vain to declare itself against courage and bravery, then they are boring and disgusting: even the language in which they are presented is dull, sluggish, uncertain and without all charm: a "therefore we must assume", a "it thereby gains the appearance as if" is the only turn which stands at the command of such warriors. Herr Gruppe must, however, speak so, he must content himself with mere "assumptions", with an appearance which he may not even examine whether it is grounded in the matter, since he in fact knows nothing less than the book about which he wants to give his judgment. "Hereby — after a" passage in the said essay — hereby, says Herr Gruppe p. 54, it gains the appearance as if Bauer himself were in the case which he imputes to his so-called apologists and charges them so heavily with, namely that he has still quite other thoughts in the background than he expresses according to the words in his book. Herr Gruppe wonders how I "can give myself the air of restoring Christianity in its true essence and actually only defending and protecting it against the apologists."

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308 Where, however, are the words which contradict the other thoughts which I have in the background? Where do I "give myself the air of restoring Christianity against the apologists"? The question: why has Herr Gruppe not thoroughly illuminated the background in which I conceal my true thoughts and, if possible, set it on fire? — this question we may not even raise. Where then are the words?

[Notes for 308 here]

309 Herr Gruppe cites only one passage: Synopt. II, 297: "and what do I say here? What I have so often said and still more, what I have done, that the critic rescues scripture and the letter against the theologians and frees them from their maltreatments. Holy scripture and its text!"

[Notes for 309 here]

310 "Holy scripture" critique first restores. Also Christianity it restores, but only so that it recognises scripture, this Christianity, namely its essence and its origin. Is theoretical recognition, however, the practical restoration in the sense that it reinstates the recognised in its dominion over the world? Where have I said that? Christianity, religion, theology are powers which, when they are recognised, cease to be a power.

[Notes for 310 here]

311 (Incidentally, from the cited section (Synopt. II, 296) Herr Gruppe makes out p. 20 that I represent myself in my "baroque manner as a prophet.")

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312 The manner in which Herr Gruppe has come to this discovery I will not designate more closely, since I do not wish to enter more deeply into the mystery of how malice and blindness have conspired to guide Herr Gruppe on this voyage of discovery. Herr Gruppe has remained in our debt for indicating the route of the journey. It is his affair to illuminate the mystery. He must do it. He must do it publicly before the public. In this section I speak of the saying about the sign of Jonah, I treat p. 293-299 of this saying, in order to secure the correct explanation against the theological experiences: I explain what, according to the Gospel, Jesus says, and Herr Gruppe, despite the cleanest and sharpest exposition, is capable of asserting that I had declared myself a prophet, that I had said of myself what I only secure as the correct meaning of Jesus' saying against the theologians.

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313 In the same place of my writing Herr Gruppe has found still another very grave offence, which is also probably to be explained only from my "baroque manner", he has namely not understood how the critic can come to say that he drives the theologians, who have defiled the temple, not with the rope, not with passion, no, "in all peace of soul" out of the same. Herr Gruppe thus did not know that the rope, about which he is highly astonished — he expresses his astonishment by means of an exclamation mark very energetically — is the rope of which John 2:15 says: "and he made a scourge of small cords and drove them all out of the temple.")

[Notes for 313 here]

314 So has Herr Gruppe read my writings. So must all read them who want to destroy them. The best would read them who throw them into the fire.

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315 So little does Herr Gruppe know how to read my writings and to draw from them themselves the judgment about them, that he — unheard of! no! quite natural on this standpoint! — must first open Marheineke's dogmatics in order to reproach me! — let one hear! — me! p. 60 with "violence of word-explanation". He speaks of me as if I, just like the older Hegelians, thought that Bible passages could be brought into harmony with philosophical determinations, as if I endeavoured to confirm the truth of philosophical determinations by Bible passages!

[Notes for 315 here]

316 Herr Gruppe is all too innocent and incapable of grasping the malice of critique. Himself childishly minded, he has also taken critique for a child and not seen that it first correctly explains holy scripture because it lets it depend on whether even senselessnesses, thoughtlessnesses and the most groundless contradictions come out when it is correctly explained. He has not seen that this freedom of critique, this freedom which is left to scripture so that it can be and say what it will, is only possible when the break with the religious presupposition, thus also with the presuppositions of scripture, is completed.

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317 Critique knows that scripture, as soon as it is correctly explained, can no longer count as source and norm of truth — and Herr Gruppe speaks of me as if I wanted to see it in agreement with the teachings of philosophy!

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318 So speaks Herr Gruppe about a critic who has not shrunk from sending scripture into the field against philosophy, because he knows how little it can accomplish against its opponent, even if it wanted to destroy it thoroughly. Because he knows — and has Herr Gruppe not proved it again? — that faith no longer has the breath required for it, the critic himself blows the trumpet of the last judgment, to show how faith and holy scripture judge science. "Art and religion" he lets the comedy perform in which religion proves itself as the heavenly mockery of art — and yet he is still supposed to have the intention of bringing scripture and philosophy into harmony?

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319 It was fine of Herr Gruppe that he has risen to the struggle against science, and it will be highly credited to him when the trumpet of the last judgment is blown; it must be credited to him according to the promise of scripture in this world as in that; but in real history, in which the fate of science is decided, today already — for tomorrow he will no longer be remembered — he has nothing more to expect: he has his reward.

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320 It would have been better — one might perhaps think — if the opponents of critique had really presented its method, examined it and judged its results, so that the strength of the opponents might make the victory of critique more honourable: the question is, however, solely and alone whether their powers reached so far that they could dare even the attempt of such a critique — a question which we have already answered when we showed that they could not even understand the first tasks and the position of critique in general.

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321 Was it, for example, to be demanded of Marheineke that he should have examined more closely an undertaking which counts and had to count for him only as an "aberration", that he should have deemed worthy of a serious examination principles and scientific successes which count and had to count for him as airy hypotheses?

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322 Herr Gruppe has confessed that it is not so easy to say "wherein the peculiarity of my works consists": would it not now, after what we have learned of him, have been too cruel a demand to require of him that he should grasp the peculiarity of the more recent critique and — refute it? Herr Gruppe owed it to himself to spare his powers: the duty of self-preservation had to determine him, as well as the thought that his person, in a time when "the word of the Lord was precious" (I. Sam. 3, 1.), must indeed still be highly necessary.

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323 What a terrible struggle, then, if critique does not even have an opponent with whom it could measure itself? If Herr Gruppe does not find it so easy to indicate wherein the peculiarity of the more recent critique consists, shall I first tell him? i.e., shall I copy my book once more? Or copy once more everything that I have set forth about it in my writing on "Hegel's Doctrine of Art and Religion"? Shall I prove to Marheineke that my work is no aberration, that its principles are not hypotheses snatched from the air, i.e., shall I again copy my book?

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324 What a struggle, then — the struggle against nothing.

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325 Impatience against which we would, however, according to the previous endurance, still hold out, gains the upper hand over us, appears the reviewer who has announced my writing on the Synoptics in the Berlin Yearbooks. I will use his work to demonstrate on it word for word, sentence for sentence, how the theologian must exert himself when he finally really attempts to enter into critique. If the newspaper report that the reviewer is at the same time the author of the "theological opinion" is correct, then my proof that the theologian as such cannot understand critique and may not understand it will let the indefiniteness of that opinion appear in a new light and fully explain the lack of courage with which the Berlin reviewer behaves towards critique.

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326 But also the others, also Marheineke, also Herr Gruppe have proved to us with everything they have hitherto brought forward about and against critique that they are not even capable of correctly grasping it.

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327 To excess they have furnished this proof still in a particular question — in a question which must have been decided for them and in the answering of which they would not have exposed themselves as they have done, if they had heeded what I have set forth in my writing.

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328 Despite the fact that at decisive points — I could, however, have done it in every paragraph, if it were not disgusting and useless to combat so subordinate a standpoint, conquered once and for all — I have proved how deep Schleiermacher's view of the origin of the Gospels lies below the height of the present critical principles — so deep that it stands almost in no relation to these, how Schleiermacher in his writing on the Gospel of Luke has fallen prey to the superstition of the letter in a revolting manner: despite this, Marheineke counts it (p. 76) among the "circumstances which mitigate my aberration" that Schleiermacher, both through his critical writings and through his dialectical dissolutions of dogma, has significantly prepared the way for Bauer and that this one has only continued and completed what that one had only half finished."

[Notes for 328 here]

329 Herr Gruppe was just as strongly armoured against my proofs, i.e., he has so little noticed from my expositions how the more recent critique must deal with Schleiermacher, that he dares ... yet this matter deserves, under circumstances like the present, where one seeks to revive in Schleiermacher the lord of true and the conqueror of false critique, to be treated as No. 1 in a particular section, namely in the section in which I show how incapable the opponents of the more recent critique are of understanding it itself and its relation to earlier critical

[Notes for 329 here]