II. The government's inquiry to the faculties

69 Marheineke begins his opinion with a thanksgiving to the ministry that it has given the faculty, through its inquiry, the opportunity "to express itself freely and openly about my scientific position."

70 This thanksgiving is as ill-placed as the remark, "it is, in any case, most gratifying and redounds to the high honour of the Prussian State to have made an arrangement as a result of which so many spiritual powers and exertions are first summoned in order possibly to have the success that a scholar living in his scientific researches, and even if he were not yet in the state service, but only a Privatdozent, can be removed from his place" (p. 64). This is spoken as if the government — for only of this, not of the "State", is there talk here — could also have acted otherwise without violating its honour, as if it could have dealt more summarily with a scholar who is "only a Privatdozent", as if I, as Licentiate of Theology and Privatdozent, as if I did not have through my scientific works rights against which all theological faculties in the world could accomplish even the least. Instead of giving the government a praise which is highly ambiguous, since it contains the presupposition that it could also have made shorter process, instead of limiting or making squint this praise by the remark, "it would have been desirable that some foreign faculties had also been called upon, since their judgment could have been of particular weight", instead, therefore, of limiting or making squint this praise by this very ambiguous remark — since it now seems that the government has turned to a court which, of lesser weight, could offer less resistance to its wishes and inclinations — Marheineke should rather have investigated whether the theological faculties could at all be the court by which a question, which he himself designates as a scientific one, could be decided.

71 Through the inquiry: "what standpoint I take, according to my writing, in relation to Christianity", says Marheineke, the matter has been transferred to the ground of science. "Through this significant step the honour of science has been recognised" (p. 64); yes, by this inquiry having been sent to the faculties, "freedom of teaching has also been proclaimed anew on the part of the government" (p. 80). That is the same conclusion which inspires Herr Gruppe to a praise of the authorities who "were of the opinion" that there was no ground for a prohibition of Strauss's writing on the life of Jesus (p. 6). So the authorities, who inquire of Neander whether the work of Strauss is to be prohibited, were of the opinion that there was no ground for a prohibition? As if the inquiry of Neander would then have been necessary. So the government proclaims freedom of teaching when it asks the theological faculties what standpoint a critic takes, according to his writings, towards Christianity and whether the author of such writings, according to the determination of the universities and the theological faculties in particular, is further to be permitted the permission to teach? It proclaims freedom of teaching by doubting — for if it did not doubt, it would not pose those questions — whether it is to be permitted in this particular case? By inquiring, moreover, of a corporation and indeed inquiring in such a way that it wants the decision to be made dependent on the judgment of the corporation, not decided from general points of view, not from the only decisive point of view?

72 It is not true that the ministry wishes to be informed about my "scientific position" — for in that case the question could only be how I relate to the matter and to the preceding scientific works which have hitherto been delivered by scholars on the same subject.

73 The ministry wants to know my relation to Christianity, but this relation not in the scientific sense, whether I have recognised Christianity, its origin, sacred history and historiography, but rather how my works, without regard to whether they are correct or not, relate to Christianity, namely to its continuance and its positive, unrecognised propositions and unexamined demands.

74 On the ground of science the question could only have been whether I am theoretically right.

75 Should the question once receive a practical turn — and it will now receive this turn — then it could only have been asked whether Christianity, if critique has truth on its side, still has a right to exist and whether the theological faculties must not necessarily in this case dissolve themselves, one and all.

76 Even if the question were purely scientific, its decision could not be expected from corporations, and if it were nevertheless put to them, its meaning could only have been that one simply wanted to know what these particular corporations think and how they, on their side, conceive the matter. The scientific question would have become a question of curiosity. Whether in this case one or several universities, whether only domestic or also foreign faculties were consulted, would be highly indifferent for the matter, only curiosity and its satisfaction would have been greater. For him, however, who knows the history of theological researches, even this curiosity is not possible, since he knows from the outset how the scholars who stand on a superseded standpoint express themselves against the higher one.

77 But as it is, the government's inquiry, instead of any scientific purpose, has only the one practical meaning, that the faculties are to decide whether their interest and existing Christianity can still tolerate views by which, according to the judgment of "many weighty voices, the actual continuance of Christian truth in its innermost ground is attacked". The question is only that of practical compatibility or incompatibility, whether the theological faculty can tolerate the consequence of its own principles, the unveiling of its secret, whether existing, unrecognised and only believed Christianity can tolerate the knowledge of its essence and origin — but simply only the question of practical compatibility, since there is no thought of the question whether the critical works are the consequence of previous theology and the unveiling of the secret of Christianity.

78 Even if Marheineke might have misrecognised the position of the question, instead of criticising it and arriving at the correct position through critique, even if he therefore presupposed from the outset that the matter had been "placed on the ground of science" by the government's inquiry, he should at least have really established himself on this ground: perhaps it would have succeeded for him to draw others, especially the government, to which alone he had to think, over to the same ground.

79 He does not do so, however. He gives up the advantage which his illusion afforded him — his illusion rather goes so far or passes over into the other, that he thinks himself on the ground of science, which he does not tread with one foot, when in fact he only asks how my works are compatible with Christianity, and when, in order to prove their harmlessness, he depicts critique as a game of theological arbitrariness, whose manner and outcome have not the slightest influence on the existence of the church.

80 Without knowing it, he has therefore placed himself on the standpoint which the government assigned him, but he could not possibly satisfy it if he designated critique in general as a practically indifferent thing; he could also not really calm it if he called my works a glorification of Christianity — for how can the government consider it possible that the arbitrary fancies of critique should glorify Christianity — if he finally asserts that I have voluntarily renounced my theological character and can no longer remain in the theological faculty, the government could see no succour in this, since he does not ground his assertion on the dangerousness of my works.

81 Marheineke denies altogether that a collision can occur when he depicts critique as a game which can have no decisive consequences for existence. He denies that in this particular case a collision has occurred, since he calls my writing a glorification of Christianity; and if he nevertheless presupposes a collision by wanting me to be expelled from the theological faculty, he may not say that it has been brought about by the method and the success of my critique.