IX. The presumption of critique

756 In the preface to my writing on the synoptic Gospels I remark that my proof of the late origin of the reflection-concept of the Messiah "first emancipates biblical criticism, takes from it the last support which it possessed in the unrecognised positive, and transfers it into the free element of self-consciousness."

757 Herr Gruppe naturally does not know what the talk is about, in his head only the word "unrecognised positive" runs around, he notices approximately that critique does not want to recognise the positive as such, as mere presupposition, as a given, — immediately he now says, according to the view of critique everything unrecognised positive should disappear "disappear!" — and "in this proposition" — the proposition of which I speak before, the proposition that the reflection-concept of the Messiah did not come to the Christian community as a finished given, the proposition of which I say that it takes from critique the last support in the unrecognised positive, this proposition has thus for Herr Gruppe suddenly become the proposition that everything unrecognised positive should disappear, he thus does not even know of which proposition I speak and what I say of this proposition: in short he said: "in this proposition lies actually (!) the general declaration of war." (p. 50, 51.)

758 Good: we want to take the proposition generally, as critique must indeed regard it as its first law: why have you then not proved, Herr Gruppe, that the setting up of this proposition is a misdeed, the following of this law a wrong, that the war which it announces is an unjust, an impermissible war?

759 Why you have not done it? For the simple reason that you, like all opponents of the more recent critique, as soon as you go to the matter itself and wanted to show that it really lies at your heart, would have to notice that the war is already finished, because you do not possess enough strength to begin the war anew, because you, like all opponents of critique, can only command over the bare proposition: "it is yet far too terrible!" when you absolutely want to announce war to it.

760 You can announce the war, but you will and cannot wage it.

761 The opponents of critique do not grasp it, do not understand it, but we also turn only to those who still take part in humanity and its rights, when we pose the question: whether that is the true peace, if we let ourselves be ruled by an "unrecognised positive", by an unexamined presupposition. Is it not rather this presupposition which lies at war with us? Is it not Critique. it which, for the sake of its validity and dominion, forbids us thinking, i.e., robs us of our humanity?

762 And this war of the positive against us, against thinking, against the right of research, in short against freedom and humanity is an unjust war, since the positive fights only for an appearance, for the appearance that it has not sprung from humanity, for the appearance that it has fallen from heaven, while it is nevertheless nothing but a work of humanity and its history. The domineering and freedom-murdering presupposition fights for an illusion: we fight for freedom, for our freedom, but also for the honour and freedom of the positive, when we recognise and prove that it has sprung from the noblest thing there is, from historical self-consciousness.

763 Only the false appearance and the illusion of the positive must disappear.

764 "What? Then everything ceases!" say the brave ones who cling to appearance, the worthy men who have long since dissolved the positive of the old world-view in their indolence and indifference, the sound, solid and cordial honourable men who recognise the given only apparently, only with the lips, when it is a question of reviling bravery, the strong men who are horrified when one goes for the presupposition itself, and who tremble when they should confess to themselves that they have fundamentally, if only in their indolence, dissolved the positive, yes, that say the comprehensive spirits whose spirit and self-consciousness is only too narrow to be able to take up the positive in its true, original, i.e., in its spiritual form into themselves.

765 "Philosophy, says Herr Gruppe p. 51, must, in order to appropriate the objects, assimilate them to itself, i.e., involve them in its vertigo, dissolve them into its nothing." Is reason then the vertigo? A pure, empty nothing? Of course, if reason were in general the reason of Herr Gruppe, i.e., a reason in which the object finds no dwelling-place, no home, but only individual catchwords, only misunderstood catchwords drive about in motley confusion.

766 Nothing in humanity can arise otherwise than from the interior. Is that now an involvement in the vertigo of reason, if the scattered and confused products of history are gathered into their unity and true order? Is it a dissolution into nothing, if what has arisen historically is led back into its home, into the interior, into self-consciousness, into its origin?

767 Marheineke calls this return into general self-consciousness "sweet egoism" (p. 40): he has, however, not proved that there is any other reality outside the One, self-consciousness, he has overlooked that general self-consciousness is the overcoming of egoism, which wants to maintain itself in opposition to the world, history, the development of history and its results, and critique has proved that precisely this egoism can only do wrong to the objects, can only maltreat them.

768 Yes, so it really is: critique glorifies Christianity and will glorify it still more and more, but only as it glorifies all other religions, by giving them back to self-consciousness. Critique restores Christianity by defending it against all previous false explanations, but the first false explanation is that which it itself sets up when it alienates itself as a heavenly gift from humanity and its history.

769 If Christianity is recognised and secured against its own false explanation, then it falls indeed for history and for all who take part in its progress, as religion, namely as ruling or pretentious and oppression-seeking religion, for that false explanation, that presupposition and illusion first makes it into religion. However, who can kick against the pricks? If religion itself has spurred on knowledge through its false presumption, who can and will set limits to knowledge and truth? Again presumption and illusion? Impossible! Truth is invincible.

770 But it is not oppression-seeking, not pretentious — it is tolerant. As nature lets its various formations and realms exist alongside each other, and precisely thereby first gives each realm its true significance and position, so also is truth tolerant and knowledge will least of all think of overthrowing any work of the spirit in such a way that it would want to raise another product of the same to sole rule.

771 If therefore Christianity is also comprehended, i.e., for the concept, for freedom, for true, namely for progressive history, completely overthrown as a religious power, it is therefore not yet abandoned to or fallen prey to the "tyranny of the concept."

772 "Everywhere, says Herr Gruppe p. 54, room is to be given to philosophy." Insofar as it is a question of examining the limits which have hitherto been set to knowledge and, if they are scientifically untenable, of crossing them: indeed! But with that it is not yet said that Christianity is also to be externally eradicated by philosophy as religion simply, for all and for everyone. The same philosophy which wants to have room everywhere will, for example, draw a limit before the individual Gruppe and decree that he must have a god, and indeed a quite indefinite god, who presents his inner indefiniteness as his true essence, since he is not in a position to recognise it and thus to abolish it.

773 Also Marheineke says against critique: "so only philosophy is to be everything in everything." (p. 86). We will show on the contrary what rather from now on is to be everything in everything and how tolerant philosophy is towards religion.