I. Theological freedom

21 All opponents of critique assure that freedom of inquiry within the theological faculty shall not be restricted, but if the critic makes use of this freedom, he must pay for it and leave the faculty: what kind of freedom is that, then, which is a right in word, but in fact a wrong?

22 When it is declared in the name of the government that in the "decision" of the question concerning me, it was chiefly a matter of not restricting freedom of teaching and inquiry further than is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the principles of the Evangelical Church and theology and than the determination of the theological faculties in their relation to the church makes indispensable", then freedom is conceded insofar as it is permitted by the principles of the Evangelical Church: one of these principles, however, not only permits it, but demands it.

23 In its expert opinion, the theological faculty at Bonn "has so little lost sight of the freedom of philological, critical and historical research in theology which has prevailed in Protestant Germany for more than half a century, that it rather wishes this freedom, in opposition to a rigid dogmatism and letter-faith, to be designated and safeguarded as a necessary condition for a living formation of theology."

24 Herr Gruppe goes even further when he comments on this declaration of the Bonn faculty: according to him, the freedom of research has not prevailed for only half a century — many a thing has already prevailed for fifty years and yet had to fall because its rule was not legitimate — but (p. 32): "from its origin, the exact exegesis of the biblical text has always been essential to the Evangelical confession and all means of science have been used for this purpose, first diplomatic criticism for the constitution of the text, then philological research for the usage of language, further archaeological knowledge for the understanding of the antiquities occurring, likewise geography and history for the comprehensive elucidation of all relations. By no external barriers has theology here (!) been separated from the rest of science, it has always kept pace with it and in fact it lies in the sense and essence of the Evangelical confession, which seeks to grasp the whole spiritual man, that for this purpose it gives room to every kind of conviction and thus permits every research."

25 Farthest of all, finally, goes Marheineke when he grounds freedom in the essence of theology itself.

26 "Theology is in his view (p. 38) 'philosophy, insofar as it has religion for its object.' 'It is the Christian church itself' which has had the liberality 'freely to release science from itself and to declare it of age' (p. 65, 66). 'Critique places itself and moves on the standpoint of the spirit free in itself, without which Protestant theology cannot be, and it would no longer be the free spiritual movement if it were to proceed only from presuppositions which came to it from the side of the letter' (p. 68). Even according to the statutes of the theological faculty, the 'theoretical,' 'occupation with science' is the first, the main thing, it is named first, and the 'practical, the useful,' the determination of students for church service, is by no means made the 'standard' 'according to which the theoretical and its value are to be determined' (p. 81, 82)."

27 I therefore do not see why I am damned and deprived of the freedom to teach at the theological faculty.

28 Freedom, insofar as the principles of the Evangelical Church permit it, is the freedom to research in scripture independently of every external authority and to seek its true meaning, and of this freedom I have made use.

29 Scripture — such is the principle which belongs to the first principles upon which the Protestant Church is founded — scripture is the sole source from which that which is to count as Christian is to be drawn, the norm by which everything that wishes to count as Christian is to be measured.

30 Well then! as a critic I have only made use of this freedom and sought to elucidate the essence of sacred history and thereby the origin of Christianity from the correct explanation of the Gospels. But why should this freedom not be permitted to me? Is it perhaps, as I apply it — but apply it in the sense of the Protestant fundamental principle — a transgression? Is it to be permitted to all other theologians? Only not to me? Only not to the critic?

31 I have made use of the "freedom of philological, critical and historical research which has prevailed in Protestant Germany for more than half a century", I have sought to restore the pure text of the Gospels, I have carefully observed the usage of language of the Gospels and constantly brought it to recognition in its purity against the abuses of earlier exegetes, I have communicated not a few new archaeological studies which first cast their true light upon the geographical and historical presuppositions of the Gospels — yes, more than that, the art of my work consists precisely in this, that I gain the understanding of sacred history only by means of "philological, critical and historical research" and refrain from every operation by means of dogmatic propositions or philosophical presuppositions: why then is "philological, critical and historical research", when I apply it in practice, a wrong? Why must I suffer for that which otherwise Protestant theologians extol as one of the greatest benefits one enjoys in their church? Is philological, critical and historical research, when I practise it, no longer a "necessary condition for a living formation of theology"? Do they wish it granted only to theologians for themselves? Not to me? Not to him who practises it conscientiously and places his fame and his honour precisely in this conscientious practice? Is this freedom a privilege for the theologian and denied to him who, precisely by practising it correctly and purely, wishes to deserve the name and the rights of a theologian?

32 Freedom, insofar as the principles of the Evangelical Church permit it, is the freedom to research in scripture independently of every external authority and to seek its true meaning, and of this freedom I have made use. Scripture — such is the principle which belongs to the first principles upon which the Protestant Church is founded — scripture is the sole source from which that which is to count as Christian is to be drawn, the norm by which everything that wishes to count as Christian is to be measured.

33 If finally Marheineke explains the faculty statute to the effect that the "propagation of theological knowledge" is the first, the main thing, and the second, the "qualification of youths for church service shall only take place through the former", then I have complied with this statute as well as anyone. I have indeed practised theory as the first thing, practised it for its own sake, I have striven above all for the truth and correctness of theory and I have indeed and in all earnest made the "qualification for church service" dependent on theory and its results. I therefore, if it is a matter of following that statute, do not at all see why I am to be expelled from a faculty whose statutes I follow punctually and even rigorously, I also do not see how Marheineke can assert under these circumstances that I have "voluntarily renounced my theological character", how he can arrive at the conclusion that there can be no more staying for me in the theological faculty. I am to be expelled from a faculty whose laws I have faithfully followed, perhaps for the first time since they were given, conscientiously and strictly followed? But perhaps Marheineke has not correctly explained the faculty statute? No! He has grasped its meaning correctly. If "the theological faculty has the determination to propagate the theological sciences according to the teaching of the Evangelical Church", and if it is the teaching of the Evangelical Church that holy scripture alone is to be regarded as the source, norm and canon of that which is to count as truth, then it is certain that theory, research, science is the first thing — for scripture must first be investigated before it can be determined what is to count as truth — and so it follows necessarily that the preparation of youths for church service can only take place accordingly and to the extent that the result of the free investigation of scripture shapes itself. I have complied with this statute so far, so conscientiously, that in my investigation of scripture I even let it depend on whether "youths" can still be prepared for church service at all if they are guided to the correct explanation of scripture.

34 Am I therefore guilty because I have followed the faculty statute so strictly that I even let it depend on the danger that the faculty, by virtue of its own law, must dissolve itself if scripture is correctly explained, and no one who possesses the key to scripture can any longer decide for church service? Am I guilty if I have conscientiously exercised the freedom of research according to the principle of the Evangelical Church and have arrived at the result that the church, by its own principle, is forced to give itself up? Is it my fault if "philological, critical and historical research" has led me to the certain result that sacred history contradicts all real history, that it is not real history, that it is only a product of religious imagination, that the sacred historical books are not real historical books and distinguish themselves from all other books ever written only by lack of all coherence and by the number and magnitude of their contradictions? Is it my fault if the correct further development of theology brings about the dissolution of theology?

35 Indeed it is my fault. I have erred when I took the principle of the Evangelical Church seriously, when I gave good faith to the assurance that the freedom of philological, critical and historical research in theology must be granted, and when I really held the scientific investigation of scripture to be the first task and determination of the theological faculty.

36 My guilt is all the greater since I have erred intentionally, strayed with diligence. With free premeditation and after mature consideration I have committed the error of taking seriously all those ecclesiastical and theological assurances about the significance and freedom of scriptural research, of really letting them benefit me and of using them conscientiously.

37 The measure of critical transgressions is, however, finally filled when I — this confession I cannot avoid — accepted the freedom offered by the church and by theology with the consciousness that if it is taken seriously, all other presuppositions of the church and theology simultaneously collapse and draw the whole ecclesiastical edifice into their fall.

38 The Protestant Church does not admit that scripture should be the source, norm and canon of all that is to count as Christian, it does not want the content and fate of so-called Christian truth to proceed from free scriptural research, it does not tolerate free scriptural research, for all that which is to be found in scripture, which is to be gained as the meaning and content of scripture, it has prescribed in advance in its symbols. The freedom which it grants its adherents is no freedom, the scriptural research which it demands is no research.

39 Even in the case when the symbols have lost their real validity — for the theologians who rise up against the more recent critique, however, they in fact no longer hold — when therefore only an indefinite remnant of the earlier system of faith remains or the indefiniteness of the feeling of dependence constitutes the whole religion and the whole content of theology, even then research is still restricted, or rather it is more terribly restricted than ever before, since the theologian must fear that every definite knowledge would put an end to his principle, indefiniteness. Now the theologian trembles for his presupposition and, in order not to violate it, becomes all the more inhibited, all the more confused in his scriptural research, whereas the earlier theologian, inhibited by a sound, compact presupposition, feared no danger for it, let himself be patiently guided by it and remained at one with himself in scriptural research, i.e., with the presupposition to which he had unconditionally subjected himself.

40 "Freedom of teaching and research insofar as it is possible for the preservation of the principles of the Evangelical Church and theology" is no longer freedom, it is servitude, for the freedom of research is instantly withdrawn as soon as one should dare to investigate these principles of the church and theology themselves. The freedom of research may not venture upon the presuppositions of the church, it may not even be asked whether these principles and presuppositions of the church are grounded in scripture. There, where alone it would be worth the trouble to research, research is forbidden. Only in secondary matters, in the inessential, is it permitted. The prisoner may walk about in the prison, but he may not leave it; even the idea that he is in a prison is forbidden him.

41 Freedom in side-issues, in the inessential, is no freedom. The walk in the prison yard is no longer a walk. Who can really research the inessential if the investigation of the essence is forbidden him? Who can at all determine what is essential and inessential if the free critique of the essence is a crime? Rather, even in the treatment of side-issues one must fear that one has to do with something essential; this fear is natural and grounded in the matter itself, since indeed the inessential in spiritual things cannot be separated from the essence by a stroke; freedom is therefore itself only an illusion even in side-issues. The essence observes the poor wretch who thinks he is freely walking in side-issues, it has him observed by its spies, it sets traps for him — freedom is gone, just as the prisoner cannot possibly move freely if in every window of the prison the guards lie in wait and the prison ward follows him even at his heels. Even the freest movement in prison is an absurdity — it is everything else, only not free movement.

42 With the "freedom of philological, critical and historical research" which the theological faculty wishes to have safeguarded, it is therefore nothing. Who will vouch that the entire Gospel does not fall, if even in one single evangelical narrative the incoherence of the individual parts is as great as it is otherwise never encountered, in no literature, in no kind of writing? Who vouches that critique does not arrive at the result that a multitude of contradictions of the evangelical history have their ground purely and solely in the hastiness and thoughtlessness of the sacred writers? And who can well answer for it that the historical and geographical relations, as they are presupposed in the Gospels, correspond to the real relations? No sensible person will answer for it — but the theologian can, will, the theologian really answers for it. Theological freedom. His philological researches — in my writing I have furnished the proof — are now no longer philological, his critical ones no longer critical and his archaeological ones everything else, only not archaeological. He does not investigate the inner structure of the evangelical reports, but proceeds from the outset with the aim of demonstrating their coherence: he presupposes that everything in these reports is in order and correctness. He does not explain the contradictions between the reports, rather he regards as his first task against the unbelievers the demonstration that harmony is everywhere present. He does not research the historical relations as they really were at that time into which the Gospels wish to transport us, but, presupposing the correctness of the evangelical statements, he is no longer in a position — I will not say, to grasp correctly, but — even to seek the clearest statements in the profane writers of that time. His archaeology, like his philology and critique, is a chimera.

43 Accordingly, Marheineke has also not correctly explained the faculty statute, not discovered its secret meaning. If it is the determination of the faculty "to propagate the theological sciences according to the teaching of the Evangelical Church", then it has only to propagate, i.e., to hand over to the students that which is already there and must by no means change its definite and specific form, just as it is there and was given: essential changes in the material to be propagated are not permitted, and compendia will be what the theological teacher has to hold to if the theological faculty wishes to fulfil its determination correctly. The teacher who only propagates sciences must abstain from all self-activity, all free thinking. For his restriction, however, provision is also expressly made when he has to propagate the theological sciences according to the teaching of the Evangelical Church: "according to the teaching of the Evangelical Church", this determination has namely the secret meaning which we have just indicated, that the ecclesiastical presuppositions are the prison in which the theological teacher has to place himself as a prisoner.

44 It is very easy to explain how it comes about that Marheineke did not notice the secret meaning of this theological article or at least could not develop it with clear consciousness; he lives in the prison and does not know that he is a prisoner, is a prisoner even when he makes the pretence to himself as if he had all the free movement that man can only demand or make for the care of his health. He not only does not want "that theology be convulsively enclosed by religion, by faith from knowledge", he not only demands for religion "all freedom of inner movement, all independence on its own territory", but he is also, as we have already remarked, of the conviction that science is "set free" by the magnanimity and grace of the church. According to him, science is not the slave, but the freedwoman of the church, it is no longer subject to the car tel est notre bon plaisir of the church, but the authority which is set over it by the grace of God has, of its own resolve, in order to comply somewhat with modern ideas, most graciously octroyed freedom, voting rights and even the right of granting taxes, the right to determine the heavenly budget. By pointing to this octroyed charter, Marheineke says (p. 65): "if piety begins to judge theologically from faith alone, then judging thereby transforms itself into prejudging." However, the freedom which is only a gift of grace of the absolute lord is no real freedom, rather every moment, if it wants to prove itself as freedom, i.e., if it forgets its origin from grace, wants to disavow its origin, the lord has a right to intervene and to let the presumptuous freedwoman feel his superiority. This freedom, however, in fact always remembers at the right time its origin from grace, it confesses its dependence from above and then says: "the teachings and truths of religion want to be known, proven i.e. comprehended", i.e., the will of religion is the decisive thing, philosophy must obey, religion wants its truths to be proven and philosophy most obediently presupposes that the knowledge of religion is its proof, the proof of its correctness, the proof of the correctness of the religious presuppositions. Religion wants it so and philosophy throws itself into the arms which convulsively enclose it. Philosophy no longer has the right to give itself the determination which lies in its essence, to know and to let it depend solely on what the result of its research is, but religion prescribes to it what it has to do, and its determination is now (p. 38) "to justify the Christian teachings before reason", as if it were established that the knowledge of religion would prove the presuppositions of the same as correct. Of course it is established; but only because religion wants it so, because religion prescribes it so and philosophy "convulsively encloses in its arms." Here, on this standpoint of obedient philosophy, religion exercises the harshest tyranny and its exertion of force is the greatest, since it has to bring a freedwoman, who had already completely renounced it, back to reason or rather to unreason.

45 Yet it is not even the case that the speculative theologian has renounced the religious presuppositions even for one moment. His whole freedom is only a comedy, yes, even less than a comedy.

46 He who asserts: "from religion the form of representation can be separated (p. 37) without its essential content being thereby changed", still lies in the arms of religion, is captive to its presuppositions and attains only the appearance of freedom, yes, not even that — he no longer knows what freedom and servitude is: while he speaks of freedom and boasts of the fullest freedom, he is the most wretched servant. "The form of representation on the religious content" can only — if one wants to come from words to the matter — consist in this, that the content is distributed between two worlds, the divine, redeeming world and the human world existing only through divine power and deed, between an essential and an inessential world. Let one now take this form from the content, recognise that the religious representation of the transcendent essential world is only an illusion and that man has transferred his own essence into that world, and religion has perished in its knowledge, because it consists only in that separation, only in that representation. The form of representation is itself its content, as the speculative theologian also proves when he can only justify religion by retaining in its "concept" that religious distinction of the essential and inessential world. Indeed, he will never, when he "raises representation to concept", change the essential content, but only because he in fact does not change the form and does not leave the realm of representation. His presupposition that the essential content cannot be changed is the religious element which makes all his talk of freedom, of thinking, of the sublation of representation into self-deception.

47 He who asserts: "from religion the form of representation can be separated (p. 37) without its essential content being thereby changed", still lies in the arms of religion, is captive to its presuppositions and attains only the appearance of freedom, yes, not even that — he no longer knows what freedom and servitude is: while he speaks of freedom and boasts of the fullest freedom, he is the most wretched servant. "The form of representation on the religious content" can only — if one wants to come from words to the matter — consist in this, that the content is distributed between two worlds, the divine, redeeming world and the human world existing only through divine power and deed, between an essential and an inessential world. Let one now take this form from the content, recognise that the religious representation of the transcendent essential world is only an illusion and that man has transferred his own essence into that world, and religion has perished in its knowledge, because it consists only in that separation, only in that representation. The form of representation is itself its content, as the speculative theologian also proves when he can only justify religion by retaining in its "concept" that religious distinction of the essential and inessential world. Indeed, he will never, when he "raises representation to concept", change the essential content, but only because he in fact does not change the form and does not leave the realm of representation. His presupposition that the essential content cannot be changed is the religious element which makes all his talk of freedom, of thinking, of the sublation of representation into self-deception.

48 If this happens on the green wood, what shall happen on the dry? If the vaunted freedom of the speculative theologian is illusion, what can the freedom of the theologians be who do not even want to have the appearance as if they proceeded from thinking, who rather are not ashamed of the Gospel? They are all sinners and lack the glory before the divinity whom they serve with their lips. If the speculative theologian betrays the freedom of religion to the divinity to which he has vowed himself, it is the transgression of the ecclesiastical or biblical theologian that he proclaims a whole circle of demigods, speaks of a free critical research, a free historical research, etc., and never thinks of paying these demigods the due respect.

49 Theological freedom. Theological freedom is unfreedom, freedom as illusion and hypocrisy — hypocrisy not in that sense that the theologians have a perfect insight into the game and use the word freedom with intelligent intention in order to introduce and generalise servitude, but the hypocrisy of an objective relation and of a world-condition which individuals have not created out of pure calculation. Hypocrisy is initially only the general tragic collision which leads to the dissolution of religion, that man cannot deny man, the human, his flesh and blood, i.e., man cannot hide from himself that in religion and in the ecclesiastical articles of faith he has to do with his own work — he therefore demands the right of free research — and that in the same moment when he wants to regard his work with a human eye, he closes his eye and prostrates himself blind before his work. The fear that man must lose himself if he first truly regains himself, that his essence vanishes from him if in the alien divine essence of religion he recognises himself, the wretched fear that man will become a beast if he recovers from religion his true essence, withheld from him until now, this crime of lèse-majesté against the essence of mankind is in our days the last means by which that illusion still maintains itself.

50 If the illusion has not dawned as such on the consciousness of those who live in it, it is nevertheless perfectly expressed in their language, as we have demonstrated, and in order to put an end to the unconsciousness, it was initially sufficient to bring together the various theological statements. Always and from of old and by its nature the language of theology was illusory, because in it the inescapable claims of language, of reason, of inference lay in conflict with the religious presuppositions, with inhumanity and with absolute contradiction; but never has it been illusory to such a degree as in our days, since the thought of mankind and freedom has become so powerful and general that it disquiets even the theologian and compels him to acknowledge it, if only with his lips.

51 Let one read, for example, only once more the sentence cited above in which Herr Gruppe praises the freedom of theology and enumerates all those means which now serve "the exact exegesis of the biblical text", diplomatic criticism, philological research, archaeological knowledge, etc., let one hear his wish: "and in fact it lies in the sense and essence of the Evangelical confession, which seeks to grasp the whole spiritual man, that for this purpose it gives room to every kind of conviction and thus permits every research" in order to marvel at the enormity of this illusion. The tirade, now so often heard, "the Evangelical confession wants to grasp the whole spiritual man" — if it is once really taken seriously, what is said with it? That it lies in the essence of the Evangelical confession to attack and crush the whole spiritual man, whereas Catholicism indeed partly leaves him free? Or that the Evangelical confession does not shrink from being brought into parallel or contact with the "whole spiritual man", and that it fears nothing for itself in this contact? But is the whole spiritual man "nothing but a combined machine for diplomatic criticism, for philological research, for archaeological knowledge", etc.? Does man not also have a general essence, and if the Evangelical confession has nothing to fear from "diplomatic criticism, philological research", etc., does it also let itself be brought together without fear with general self-consciousness and with the essence of man? i.e., does it permit that man critically examine its content and investigate whether it is really the expression of his true essence, whether it is compatible with the consequent development of his self-consciousness? Do not overreach yourselves in words! Do not exaggerate in fear! Do not say that the Evangelical confession "gives room to every kind of conviction", especially you who do not know and consider what you say, especially now when it has come to light that this confession is no longer compatible not only with many kinds of conviction, but also with well-founded proofs! Do not speak of freedom at all, for true freedom cannot be combined with theology and church and religion! Do not speak of research either, for theology has up to now, even by means of "diplomatic criticism, philological research, archaeological knowledge, etc.", not yet really illuminated a single point, brought forward nothing correct about the origin and relation of the Gospels to one another, and now, when the matter is decided, critique, which solves all previous theological questions, must be expelled from the theological faculty. Give yourselves therefore no too great a self-contradiction! Say it simply out: we are servants, we want to be slaves and must be slaves if our presuppositions are to stand.

52 Yet you must give yourselves the most complete self-contradiction, so that you may be struck by your own statements and presuppositions and finally, before the eyes of all the world and according to your own right, be forced to the confession that you are slaves.

53 Permission has been taken from me to give lectures as a Privatdozent of theology because I have made illusory freedom into real freedom, because I have dared to undertake really philological, critical and historical researches, because I have taken seriously the illusory principle of Protestantism, that holy scripture is the source and norm of all that wishes to count as Christian, and have dared to determine from the document of Christianity how Christianity, first the conception of sacred history, arose.

54 It has happened to me quite rightly that the theological faculty thrust me from itself: hypocrisy cannot tolerate truth and must thrust it from itself, pretended freedom must fear real freedom, illusory research, which for eighteen centuries sought in vain to get to the bottom of the matter, rightly fears that it is at an end when real research has solved the riddle, and if it, as is indeed the case, wishes to exist as illusory research for ever and ever, until it pleases the grace from above to solve the riddles, it must separate from itself real research, which decides the matter once and for all and makes superfluous both all further brooding and the future intervention of grace and divine illumination; sophistry and rhetoric must condemn sincerity and the straight, manly word. I am rightly condemned: but why did I also put sincerity in the place of sophistry!

55 Theology knows only freedoms, only researches, only truths of religion, and consists only of theological sciences. Freedoms are the enemy of freedom, researches of research, truths of truth, sciences of science. Freedoms are privileged freedoms, researches privileged researches, i.e., the opposite of real freedom and research. They are the feudalistic and barbaric freedoms, researches and truths; they are a monopoly of him who exercises them only up to a certain point, who wants to be free, research and seek truth only up to here and no further. They are not general human rights and goods, and he who wants to lead them out of their theological barrier so that they become real freedom, research, truth and science, must atone for his deed, for he has abolished the theological privilege.

56 Why, however, do I still say that I have been condemned not only unheard, but also unjustly? Why did I not voluntarily leave a faculty with whose illusory and sophistical conduct I have broken?

57 In the letter in which the theological faculty at Bonn notified me of the decree of the ministry, it remarks at the same time that "this decree could not come unexpectedly to me". Marheineke thinks — why, we shall see later — that I had "voluntarily renounced my theological character" (p. 86). Herr Gruppe, finally, is of the opinion that as an honourable man I ought long ago to have withdrawn. (p. 22.)

58 As regards the remark of the faculty at Bonn, I have indeed, in the elaboration of my writings, had time enough to reflect on what I have to expect, since with the principle of my work and with the consequence with which it developed itself, I had to know into what relation I would enter with the existing order. I could and had to expect that the faculty and the government would take measures on their side, it was certain that they would have to initiate a procedure against me for the sake of their interest, but I calmly awaited their measures and found no reason which could have moved me voluntarily to withdraw from the association with the faculty.

59 Whether I have voluntarily renounced my theological character, insofar as the theological consists in the illusory and sophistical of freedom and research, has nothing, absolutely nothing to do with the matter in question; the only question is whether I have correctly explained the sacred history of the foundation of Christianity, whether I have illuminated the origin of the Gospels, correctly interpreted theological consciousness. Because I have solved my task, I was not yet allowed to resign; indeed, it was not even permitted to me to withdraw, if I did not want to fall into the error which the government has shared with the faculties. They have regarded the matter in such a way that they thought everything was done when they tore me out of the relation to the theological faculty. But it is not a question of my person for me, and it is not a question at all. It is also not at all a question whether I, personally, have "given up my theological character" or must renounce it. If that were the only question, if it were a matter of my person and if it were certain that the theological faculties could promise themselves an eternal existence, then I would indeed have sent back my diploma, in order to have nothing to do with this eternity, and from my writings one will know with what disposition and motivation I would have sent it back.

60 It is rather a question of theology and the theological faculty. Only then do I voluntarily withdraw from the association and the faculty, when it voluntarily gives itself up; only when it dissolves itself do I go home, for now I have only stepped aside in order not to see force marshalled against me, and my opponents rather should have foreseen this outcome and known what they have to expect if they had studied my writings more thoroughly.

61 In yet another point the faculty at Bonn believes it can draw the matter into the personal. In its letter of March 29 it expresses its regret "that my activity as a theological lecturer and as a writer so soon after I had entered into relation with it assumed such an opposite character from that which it had to consider itself justified to expect from the content of my submissions to the faculty, in which I applied for the conferment of the Licentia docendi with it."

62 Firstly, the faculty could have determined the measure of its expectations very precisely itself if it had wished to see from my writings, which had long since appeared at that time, how I stood towards theology, from my presentation of the religion of the Old Testament, that I had already set critique in motion against dogmatic representations, even if I still partly retained the presuppositions of religious consciousness, from my writing on Dr. Hengstenberg, that I had broken with the sophistry of the apologetic standpoint. Then, in the submission in which, at the request of the faculty, I described the course of development which my theological views had undergone, I expressly stated — in October 1839 — that I had finally, according to the course of my development, arrived at the firm conviction and insight that the dissolution and "negation" of the entire world of religious consciousness must be thorough and complete, so that no atom of it would be spared. Admittedly, I added that it was at the same time my firm conviction that this dissolution does no harm to the essence of Christianity, but rather that the truth of Christianity first emerges from the complete dissolution. However, I can and must say the same even now, and if I did not then say it decisively in the same sense in which I must say it now, if the statement was still unclear then, have I become untrue to myself if I have developed and raised myself to clarity — and indeed very soon, still through my works during the following winter? Have I broken my word if I only fulfilled it? Have I not defended true Christianity against theological sophistry? Have I not freed holy scripture from theological torture? May the faculty cast upon me the appearance of inconsistency if I have only redeemed my word? the faculty especially, which through its "apologetic" character has perhaps contributed not a little to my taking up again my good work, which I carried out in the letters on Dr. Hengstenberg, and continuing it in a larger field? the faculty, perhaps, to which I would not have let myself be surrendered by a well-meaning but weak government if I had thought and if it were really the case that one can only be a teacher of theology if one is devoted to theological sophistry? Who is guilty, I or the faculty? I, because I have publicly developed, further formed and consolidated before the public the conviction which I expressed before it without reserve (expressed, as it lay openly in my books published up to that time), or the faculty, which has remained standing in the indefiniteness of its apologetics and designates as a traitor him who goes for the true and ultimate goal of the theological faculty?

63 Yes, I alone have remained true to my word in this question, I alone have not let it rest at words, I have acted in accordance with the determination of the faculty when I have drawn the consequences of previous theology in the field which I have hitherto worked.

64 The faculties may turn and twist as they will: — the determination which lies in their essence is their dissolution. He who really makes use of the freedom of philological, critical and historical research, which they "wish to designate and safeguard as a necessary condition for a living formation of theology itself", leads them towards their downfall. If he is therefore condemned by them, he nevertheless has absolute right in the matter, he has right according to their own statements about the necessity of that freedom, and only relatively is he wrong, only then is he wrong when illusory freedom pronounces judgment over him. Sophistry and illusion, however — how long can they maintain their right when critique has discovered their secret and finally revealed their contradictions?

65 The theological faculty is fundamentally no longer the old one, as it has hitherto existed, when it condemns research, since formerly evil and good, tares and wheat, research and faith were united in it. If it now cuts off evil, research, from itself, if it wants to know nothing more of research, then let it look on and experience to what stage of superstition and servitude man can sink. Incidentally, it would already be its dissolution if it excluded research from itself and ignored research actually carried through, since it would thereby exclude itself from the human race.

66 Or does the faculty now first reveal its true essence when it condemns freedom, forbids research and at the same time boasts of that which it condemns as its prerogative, thus making the illusion, which it has hitherto used more or less consciously as the last means of its self-preservation, into the intentional, willed, principially prescribed illusion: good! then it has pronounced judgment upon itself and the next history will judge it according to its own verdict.

67 That is the question whose decision is at present at issue.

68 After I have given it its correct position in general, I will occupy myself with its particular sides and see these in their correct relation to the whole. First it is a question of what position the government has given itself through its inquiry to the faculties.